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DONALDSON, DANGEROUSNESS, AND THE
RIGHT TO TREATMENT
By George M. Grant*
I. Perspective on the Right to Treatment
In August, 1956, Kenneth Donaldson, a forty-eight-year-old di-
vorced Philadelphia carpenter, traveled to Florida to visit his eighty-
year-old parents who then resided in Pinellas County. The visit was
pleasant but uneventful until late November when Donaldson began to
complain of drowsiness and suggested to his father the possibility that
a neighbor might be putting something in his food. When asked why
he suspected such an unlikely occurrence, Donaldson explained that
several years earlier, while regularly eating at a diner in Los Angeles,
he had experienced similar drowsiness and on the advice of his landlady
had a urine sample analyzed by a physician. The sample showed sig-
nificant amounts of codeine, a sedative. Donaldson, a Christian Sci-
entist, had been taking no medication which could have accounted for
the presence of the drug and on the suspicion that something had been
put in his food at the diner, stopped eating there and immediately
began to feel better.
On December 10, 1956, Donaldson's father filed a petition with
the Pinellas County Court requesting a sanity hearing for his son. The
father claimed that because of a "persecution complex, [and] increas-
ing signs of paranoid delusions, petitioner believes him to be potentially
dangerous."' On the basis of this petition Donaldson was placed under
civil arrest later the same day and taken to jail. Three days later, by
recommendation of the county examining committee (two nonpsychia-
trist physicians and a deputy sheriff), Donaldson was involuntarily civ-
* Member, second year class.
1. B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 83, 84 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PIs-
oNERs]. This account of the events which led up to Donaldson's involuntary civil com-
mitment, the commitment process, and his repeated attempts to secure freedom through
the judicial process is taken from PRISONERS. See also Birnbaum, The Right -to Treat-
ment: Some Comments on its Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
MENTAL HEALTH CARE 97 (F. Ayd, Jr. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Birnbaum, Com-
ments]. Ennis and Birnbaum were counsel for Donaldson in O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975), vacating 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), the case which is the sub-
ject of this note, and in several lower court cases.
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illy committed. Thus began a period of incarceration which would last
for fifteen years.2
When Donaldson had already been institutionalized for over three
years, Dr. Morton Birnbaum, a physician (not a psychiatrist) and attor-
ney, published an article in the American Bar Association Journal en-
titled The Right to Treatment.3 In this article, Birnbaum proposed
that institutionalized mental patients have a constitutionally enforceable
right to receive therapeutic treatment. Birnbaum also advocated many
institutional reforms previously urged upon the psychiatric profession,
such as accreditation of mental hospitals by appropriate agencies, more
adequate staffing ratios, detailed recording of patient treatment and
progress, and later, Social Security Administration certification of eligi-
bility for medicare and medicaid benefits.4 The novelty of Birnbaum's
position lay in the suggestion that adequate treatment of the mentally
ill is more than simple government largess that a sane majority should
sympathetically extend to the disadvantaged insane. Rather, he ar-
gued, treatment is a right which both morality and the Constitution re-
quire as the price for the deprivation of liberty accompanying involun-
tary commitment.
Since Birnbaum's seminal article, commentators have theorized
that the constitutional legitimacy of the right to treatment springs from
the limitations imposed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the state's exercise of its parens patriae powers over
the mentally ill.' Specifically, it has been suggested that as a quid pro
2. For a description of the operation of the Florida civil commitment mechanism
which existed at that time, see PiusoNans, supra note 1, at 84-89. The due process as-
pects of this commitment process were not at issue in the Donaldson case as presented
to the Supreme Court, and as the Court noted in 422 'U.S. at 566, Florida civil commit-
ment law has been revised substantially since that time.
For details of the physical and emotional conditions that prevailed at the Florida
State Hospital in Chattahoochee where Donaldson was confined, see the Fifth Circuit
opinion in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 510-12 (5th Cir. 1974).
3. 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
4. Bimbaum's original definition of the right to treatment set forth in his seminal
article has been updated by more recent articles, such as Birnbaum, Some Com-
ments on "The Right to Treatment," 13 ARcH. GEN. PSYCMATRY 34 (1965); Birnbaum,
A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752 (1969); and Birnbaum, Comments, supra
note 1.
5. See Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and Treatment: Medical
Due Process, 15 Da PAUL L. Rnv. 291 (1966); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness,
and the Right to Treatment, 77 YAE L.J. 87, 97-104 (1967); Note, The Nascent Right
to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1137-43 (1967). The Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Donaldson, although specifically vacated by the Supreme Court, also bears reading as
perhaps the most succinct expression to date of the constitutional basis of the right to




quo for the "massive curtailment of liberty" inherent in involuntary
civil commitment, each patient must be provided with adequate psychi-
atric treatment. Continued failure to provide rehabilitative treatment
violates due process since the state's basis for institutionalization of the
mentally ill disappears absent some police power justification.
7
The right to treatment has been described in its affirmative as-
pect as "the right of involuntarily hospitalized mental patients to receive
adequate therapy as an exchange for their being deprived of their lib-
erty."" It has also been described in a more negative formulation:
"[]f the patient is confined not because he is considered dangerous,
but because of a supposed need for treatment, then, failing such treat-
ment, the justification for confinement disappears."9
Birnbaum's proposed right to treatment enjoyed a generally favor-
able reception at the time the article appeared. It was accompanied
in the same issue of the American Bar Association Journal by a strongly
supportive editorial1" and also prompted an editorial in the New York
Times. After seeing the Times article, Donaldson contacted Birnbaum
and enlisted his aid in seeking judicial review of his continuing commit-
ment in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. During the fol-
lowing eleven years, Donaldson made fourteen separate attempts be-
fore various Florida and federal courts, 1 and four before the United
States Supreme Court'" to obtain release on the grounds that he was
not dangerous, did not require institutionalization, and was receiving
inadequate treatment.13 All eighteen attempts failed. The lack of ju-
6. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
7. See PRISONERS, supra note 1; Birnbaum, Comments, supra note 1; Donaldson
v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. Robitscher, Courts, State Hospitals, and the Right to Treatment, 129 AM. J.
PSYCHITRY 298 (1972).
9. PRISONERS, supra note 1, at 89. This negative formulation of the right to treat-
ment contains subjective assumptions which require further scrutiny as discussed in
greater detail below. For example, how distinct are the boundaries of the parens patrie
power and the police power? Is treatment the only justification for segregation of the
mentally ill?
10. Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.A.I. 516 (1960).
11. PRISONERS, supra note 1, at 89.
12. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 390
U.S. 971 (1968); Donaldson v. Florida, 371 U.S. 806 (1963); In re Donaldson, 364
U.S. 808 (1960).
13. Both Ennis and Birnbaum present vivid, if not entirely unbiased, accounts of
the inadequacy of treatment provided for Donaldson and other patients at Chattahoo-
chee. Medical records showed that, except for a few hours during his first two weeks
at the facility, Donaldson was never seen by psychiatrists for periods longer than five
to ten minutes and during the next five years was seen for a grand total of two or three
hours. During one eight and one-half year period Donaldson spoke with his supervising
psychiatrist an average of fourteen minutes per year. There were twenty-eight physi-
cians at the hospital to service five thousand patients, but only eight were licensed to
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dicial response to Donaldson's pleas in the sixties led the result-oriented
Birnbaum to describe that period as the "nowhere" era in the history
of the right to treatment. 4 While it is true that the courts did not gen-
erally acknowledge a right to treatment nor order improvement of
treatment and upgrading of standards, an immense amount of academic
comment was generated which laid the foundation for future develop-
ments. In its 1961'1 and 196316 hearings on constitutional rights of
the mentally ill, the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary heard considerable testimony con-
cerning the existence of a right to treatment, and the desirability of its
statutory implementation. Under the direction of the subcommittee
chairman, Senator Sam Ervin, a right to treatment provision was in-
cluded in the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act of 1964,' 7 which
became the law of the District of Columbia.'8
It is significant that the right to treatment found its first legislative
expression in a jurisdiction with a presiding federal circuit judge who
practice in Florida. Of eighteen psychiatrists, only four were licensed to practice medi-
cine, and only two were board certified. As opposed to an ideal ratio of one psychiatrist
for every 125 patients in Donaldson's supposed condition, Chattahoochee provided about
one per 800 patients.
A Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused proffered drug and electroshock treat-
ments. The only other therapy provided was "milieu therapy" which consisted of the
exposure of Donaldson to the "therapeutic milieu" of the hospital. Although acknowl-
edged by some to be a valid therapeutic technique with particular mental patients,
"milieu therapy" at Chattahoochee was of dubious therapeutic benefit. Donaldson re-
sided in buildings many of which were over 150 years old, was confined in wards where
% of the patients were committed as criminally insane, and under the supervision of
orderlies who were oftimes illiterate (Donaldson himself had attended college). In the
decisions by the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court, Donaldson's care at Chat-
tahoochee was termed "custodial."
On Donaldson's treatment at Chattahoochee, see PRISONERS, supra note 1, 92-98;
Birnbaum, Comments, supra note 1, 97-98, 116-18. On milieu therapy, see Abroms,
Defining Milieu Therapy, 21 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHAThy 553 (1969); Cameron, Nonmedi-
cal Judgment of Medical Matters, 57 GEO. L.J. 716, 731-33 (1969); Note, Civil Re-
straint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE LJ. 87, 107 (1967).
14. Birnbaum, Comments, supra note 1, at 114.
15. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
16. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501- to -591 (1966). The right to treatment provision
is embodied in § 21-562 which reads: "A person hospitalized in a public hospital for
a mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric
care and treatment."
18. For further discussion of prior and subsequent statutory developments concern-
ing the right to treatment, see notes 21 and 26 and accompanying text infra.
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is keenly sensitive to the problems of the involuntarily committed men-
tally ill. In 1966, under the direction of Chief Judge Bazelon, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rendered
what has properly been termed a landmark decision concerning the
right to treatment in the case of Rouse v. Cameron.9 Following ac-
quittal on misdemeanor charges, plaintiff Rouse was confined for three
years without treatment in the maximum security unit at St. Elizabeth's
Hospital. Pursuant to the District of Columbia statutory provision pre-
viously mentioned, Rouse brought an action against the director of the
hospital, Dr. Dale Cameron, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The
Rouse decision, written by Judge Bazelon, was significant in two re-
spects. First, by suggesting the possibility of conditional or uncondi-
tional release in cases where "the opportunity for treatment has been
exhausted or treatment is otherwise inappropriate,"20 the decision put
teeth into otherwise uncertain statutory language.2 1  Second, and most
importantly, the court recognized the possibility that continued involun-
19. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
20. Id. at 459.
21. Birnbaum termed the District of Columbia right to treatment statutory lan-
guage a "precatory phrase" and was surprised when the Rouse court interpreted it as
it did. Birnbaum, Comments, supra note 1, at 121-22. The ten state right to treatment
statutes cited by the Rouse court as evidence of recognition of the right among the states
(373 F.2d at 455 n.21) could even more aptly be termed "precatory phrases." Most
were patterned after the National Institute of Mental Health Model Draft Act promul-
gated in 1952. In pertinent part the act provided: "§ 19. Right to humane care and
treatment. Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and treatment and, to the
extent that facilities, equipment, and personnel are available, to medical care and treat-
ment in accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical practice." NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SEcuRrY AGENCY, A DRAFT AcT GOVERNING
HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL 14-15 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51,
1951) [hereinafter cited as NIMH Model Draft Act], reprinted as Appendix A in both
editions of THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre eds.
1961) and (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971). Viewed in the overall historical context
of treatment of the mentally ill in America, the model act represented a laudable state-
ment of purpose. But from the viewpoint of public mental hospital administrators,
chronically plagued with severe budgetary constraints, the language contained an enor-
mous loophole in that facilities, equipment, and personnel need only be provided to the
extent available. Significantly, such limiting language was omitted from the District of
Columbia law passed by Congress (see note 17 supra) and has generally been absent
from statutory right to treatment provisions enacted by the states since the Rouse deci-
sion. The statutes of 26% of the states still contain provisions based on the NIMH
Model Draft Act. Alaska Stat. § 47.30.130(a) (1962); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 19-334-35
(1968); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2927 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 202.267
(1972); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, § 2252 (1965); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 202.840 (1972);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-24.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-13 (Supp.
1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.27 (1970); Okla. Stat. tit. 43A, § 91 (1954); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 33-306(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 7703 (1968); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 25-70 (1967).
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tary institutionalization without adequate treatment 22 portended serious
constitutional consequences. Thus, although Rouse's petition was dis-
posed of on statutory grounds, the Rouse court was the first to suggest
the constitutional underpinnings of the proposed right to treatment.23
Following Rouse, other courts began to speak of the rights of the
involuntarily committed (including not only the mentally ill but also ju-
veniles and the mentally retarded) in constitutional terms.24  A signif-
icant but often overlooked aspect of this judicial and academic ferment
in the late sixties is the effect it had on state right to treatment legisla-
tion. In a 1969 article concerning then pending Pennsylvania right to
treatment legislation,25 the authors made the following observation:
The direction of the preceding [line of right to treatment cases]
should be a signal to state legislatures that sooner or later the
right of every public mental institution inmate to adequate treat-
ment may be expressly placed within the 14th amendment due
process and equal protection requirements by the highest courts
of the state or even the U.S. Supreme Court.
26
In the years between the Rouse decision and the Supreme Court's
Donaldson decision, 1966 to 1975, fifty percent of the states passed
right to treatment legislation.27  Unlike earlier statutes patterned after
22. Few concepts in the area of the right to treatment are more elusive of defini-
tion than "adequate treatment." Like the concept of mental illness itself, the idea varies
with the individual or group to which it is applied. Myriad commentaries on the
right to treatment have attempted to deal with this issue. See, e.g., Schwitzgebel, Right
to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic Standards and Objec-
tive Criteria, 8 HARv. Cmy. RiGHTs-Cv. LiB. L REv. 513, 519-29 (1973); Cameron,
Nonmedical Judgment of Medical Matters, 57 GEo. L.J. 716 (1969); American Psychi-
atric Association, Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123
Am. J. PSYCIATRY 1458 (1967).
23. 373 F.2d at 455.
24. See, e.g., Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ii. 1973); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y.
1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Several later District
of Columbia cases repeated the constitutional language of Rouse. See, e.g., In re Curry,
452 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 625 (D.C.
Cir. 1969). Another District of Columbia case which actually preceded Rouse, Lake
v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966), applied the equal protection "least restric-
tive alternative" concept to the right of treatment, in essence holding that treatment pro-
vided for the involuntarily committed mentally ill should be that which causes the least
interference with the liberties of the patient.
25. Furman & Conners, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process, 8
DUQUESNE L. Rnv. 32 (1969-70).
26. Id. at 43.
27. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-511 (1974); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5001
(e), 5152 (West 1972); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 27-10-116 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-206c (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975);
FLA. STAT. ANN. 9H 394.459(2), 394.459(3)(a) (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-502.2,
88-502.3 (Cum. Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE § 66-344 (Cum. Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT.
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the National Institute of Mental Health Model Draft Act, the right to
treatment embodied in these statutes is not subject to the availability
of adequate facilities, equipment, -and personnel. The New Hampshire
statute28 is typical of the unqualified right these statutes guarantee:
Every mentally ill patient has a right to adequate and humane
treatment including such psychological, medical, vocational, social,
educational or rehabilitative services as his condition requires to
bring about an improvement in condition within the limits of
modem knowledge.
29
Thus, New Hampshire and states with similar statutes have provided
the means by which involuntarily committed mental patients can en-
force certain minimum treatment standards. No statute, however care-
fully worded, can be any more effective in the protection of personal
liberties than the courts which interpret it. Still, these newer statutes,
lacking the ambivalence of the older laws, may provide a firmer stand-
ard by which courts can assess the justifications for deprivation of lib-
erty in involuntary commitment.
Two decisions from the Fifth Circuit, the only federal circuit court
which has specifically addressed the constitutional aspect of the right
ch. 91, § 12-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976-1977); IND. STAT. ANN. § 16-14-1.5-2 (1973); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 59, § 2 (1957); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 55(e) (Cum. Supp.
1976-1977); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 330.1708 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.
17(9) (Cum. Supp. 1976); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 38-1324, 38-1304 (Cum. Supp.
1975); NEv. REv, STAT. § 433.721 (1957); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:43 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 15.03 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1975-1976); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 426.385 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 40.1-5-9 (Supp. 1974); S.D.
Con'. LAws ANN. § 27-7-50 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (Supp. 1975);
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-84.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975); WAsH. RPv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.360(2)
(1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-9(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
The Texas statute enacted in 1957 (Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5547-70) and the
Iowa statute enacted in 1939 (IowA CODE § 225.15, 1949) also might be interpreted as
right to treatment statutes.
The most ambitious attempt at right to treatment legislation occurred in Pennsyl-
vania with the proposed "Right to Treatment Law of 1968." Drafted with the aid of
Dr. Morton Birnbaum, author of the original right to treatment concept, the measure
would have established boards and committees to assure adequate treatment on an insti-
tutional and individual basis, more stringent licensing procedures for all mental hospital
personnel, and detailed records of patient treatment. The Pennsylvania General As-
sembly to date has failed to enact the statute, which was introduced in 1968 and succes-
sive years. For discussions of the Pennsylvania proposal, see Furman & Conners, The
Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process, 8 DUQUESNE L. REV. 32 (1969-1970); Robit-
scher, The Right to Psychiatric Treatment: A Social-.Legal Approach to the Plight of
the State Hospital Patient, 18 VILL. L. REV. 11, 23-24 (1972); Birnbaum, Comments,
supra note 1, at 121-22. For full text of the measure (Right to Treatment Law, S.B.
1274, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess.) see Helpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right
to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782, 811 (1969).
28. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:43 (Supp. 1975).
29. Id.
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to treatment, provide contrasting approaches to the implementation of
the right. The first case8" involved the same Kenneth Donaldson who
in 1971 had been certified competent and released from the mental
hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. Donaldson brought a damage ac-
tion against several doctors at Chattahoochee3 ' under 42 U.S.C. §
198332 alleging that his confinement constituted an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty because he was nondangerous and because he
had been provided no therapeutic treatment. At the trial, the jury
unanimously found for Donaldson, awarding $28,500 in compensatory,
and $10,000 in punitive damages. In its 1974 opinion upholding the
trial court verdict, the Fifth Circuit strongly supported a constitutional
right to treatment. The court held that "a person involuntarily civilly
committed to a state mental hospital has a constitutional right to receive
such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to
be cured or to improve his mental condition.""3  The case was signif-
icant in two respects. First, a federal appellate court for the first time
expressly and unequivocally recognized the right to treatment as consti-
tutionally required. Second, the court approved the award of damages
as a remedy for the violation of this right.34
Later in 1974, the Fifth Circuit in Wyatt v. Aderholt& relied on its
Donaldson reasoning to sustain an application of a constitutional right
to treatment to the entire Alabama state mental hospital system. Al-
though the court of appeals in Wyatt modified the manner in which the
30. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. Both defendants, Dr. O'Connor and Dr. Gumanis, were attending physicians
to Donaldson during his stay at Chattahoochee. O'Connor was superintendent of the
facility from 1963 until 1971. The suit was initiated as a class action on behalf of all
patients at the Florida State Hospital while Donaldson was still confined. Upon his re-
lease from the hospital, Donaldson was forced tp abandon the class action aspect of the
suit.
32. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
33. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974).
34. Birnbaum notes several important weaknesses of this money damages remedy.
First, with public mental hospital facilities already seriously understaffed, "the potential
of this decision to drive state hospital doctors out of these facilities is obvious." Birn-
baum, Comments, supra note 1, at 127. Second, in order for such an action for in-
juries to be brought successfully, realistically one must be out of the hospital. Id. at
126.
35. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'g in part Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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district court had chosen to implement the right,36 its support for the
constitutional basis of the right to treatment was unqualified, and its
application of the principle to an entire hospital system unprecedented.
H. The Supreme Court's Decision in
O'Connor v. Donaldson 7
A. Unanswered Questions
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Donaldson was highly
significant. With the exception of two rather minor cases from the last
century and the beginning of this century dealing largely with property
issues,"' this was the first case in which the Court agreed to deal with
the civil rights of an involuntarily committed mental patient who had
committed no crime. Unrestrained by precedent, the Court could have
confronted the challenge created by the lower court's assertion of a con-
stitutional right to treatment. 9 Instead, adhering to the "judicial prac-
36. In Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the federal district
court judge granted injunctive relief by imposing on the Alabama state mental hospital
system various objective standards ranging from staff-patient ratios to the frequency of
linen changes. Affirmed as to this relief (see note 35 supra), the decision was re-
manded in part by the court of appeals on the issue of the propriety of court ordered
sale of state lands and budget realignments mandated by the district court. See Drake,
Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AM. CaIM. L.Q. 587
(1972); Note, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients
to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1282 (1973). The "macro" approach to en-
forcement of the right to treatment in Wyatt is more in line with the approach favored
by Dr. Birnbaum than the individual approach followed in Donaldson, Rouse, and most
of the other right to treatment decisions. Birnbaum fears that by emphasizing the right
vis-a-vis the individual, "most of the time of staff physicians, nurses and other needed
personnel may well be spent in testifying and preparing to testify in courtroom proceed-
ings, rather than in attending to the needs of the hospital's patients." Birnbaum, Com-
ments, supra note 1, at 121.
37. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
38. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901); Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 9
(1872).
39. Many who had watched and participated in the judicial and academic debates
surrounding the right to treatment during the fifteen years prior to the Donaldson deci-
sion saw favorable hints in prior Supreme Court decisions. Widely quoted was the
"massive curtailment of liberty" language from Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972), a case involving the indefinite commitment of an individual under the Wisconsin
Sex Crimes Act. More specific language was found in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
738 (1972) regarding the relationship which must exist between the "nature and dura-
tion of commitment" and the "purpose" of such commitment. In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967), was sometimes relied on with reference to the quid pro quo which must be
extended due to relaxed procedural safeguards in the civil commitment process.
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tice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way,"40
Justice Stewart, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that "the dif-
ficult issues of constitutional law dealt with by the Court of Appeals are
not presented by this case in its present posture."' Accepting the jury
findings that Donaldson was not dangerous and that Dr. O'Connor con-
fined Donaldson knowing that he was nondangerous, the Court con-
cluded that O'Connor violated Donaldson's constitutional right to free-
dom.42 En route to this conclusion, the Court declared: "A State can-
not constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the
help of willing and responsible family members or friends. ' 43  Ulti-
mately, however, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit decision and re-
manded the case for reconsideration in light of a recent decision con-
cerning the qualified immunity of state officials under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.44
The Supreme Court in Donaldson nonetheless has expressed a
rule of far-reaching practical impact by holding that nondangerous
mentally ill persons capable of functioning successfully outside the
mental hospital are entitled to liberty. Donaldson's counsel, Bruce
Ennis, may not have been exaggerating when he claimed that as a re-
sult of the decision "many thousands" of harmless mental hospital in-
mates would be entitled to freedom.45
40. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
41. 422 U.S. at 573. Counsel for Donaldson, Bruce Ennis, strongly urged such
a narrow position in his argument before the Court: "Mr. Justice White: 'Some condi-
tions are not curable.' Ennis: 'But here, the patient was not dangerous. If treatment
could not improve his condition, he should be released. This is a very narrow case.'
Mr. Justice Blackmun: 'You believe that this case should be narrowly decided.' Ennis:
'Yes, what the petitioner is asking for is an advisory opinion.' . . . The Chief Justice:
'In some states, persons who are acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity have
to undergo civil commitment proceedings before they can be confined in a mental insti-
tution. In that case, he would be within your constitutional theory.' Ennis: 'But we
are not concerned with these "criminal cases." This is a much narrower case.'' 43
U.S.L.W. 3397, 3398 (Jan. 21, 1975). As a matter of tactics, Ennis sought to avoid the
risk involved in asking the Court for broad approval of a constitutional right to treatment
at the cost of the substantial gains which might result from affirmance on more re-
stricted grounds. Given the concurring opinion by the Chief Justice and comments in
the oral argument by other members of the Court, this decision seems to have been pru-
dent. See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 578 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
42. 422 U.S. at 576.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 577. As Justice Stewart noted, the vacating of the court of appeals opin-
ion by the Supreme Court removed all precedential value from the Fifth Circuit holding
strongly affirming a constitutional right to treatment.
45. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 36, col. 3.
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Nevertheless, by declining to examine the proposed constitutional
origin of the right to treatment, the Court has left major questions un-
answered. The following statement highlights one dilemma: "If one
is not getting at least minimally adequate treatment according to cer-
tain objective standards, then the patient should be able to leave the
hospital at will. Why else has he been hospitalized?' 46 Aside from
the state's exercise of its police powers in cases of alleged dangerous-
ness, is treatment the only constitutionally valid justification for invol-
untary institutionalization? Right to treatment advocates, citing the
due process quid pro quo analysis, answer with a resounding "yes."'
But, in Wyatt v. Aderholt,47 the state of Alabama suggested that "the
'need to care' for the mentally ill-and to relieve their families, friends,
or guardians of the burdens of doing so-can supply a constitutional jus-
tification for civil commitment." '48 The court of appeals rejected this
strictly "rational" state interest as a justification for civil commitment,
citing the fundamental interest in personal liberty at stake.49 In his
concurring opinion in Donaldson, however, Chief Justice Burger, after
a brief review of the history of the treatment of the mentally ill in
America, recalled the "dual functions of institutionalization" and sug-
gested that "custodial confinement" of the dependent insane may con-
tinue to be a valid exercise of the parens patriae power.50  "In short,
the idea that States may not confine the mentally ill except for the pur-
pose of providing them with treatment is of very recent origin, and
there is no historical basis for imposing such a limitation on state
power."'I Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, chose to analyze the
possible justifications for involuntary institutionalization of the mentally
ill from a negative perspective.
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's
locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely
in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can
be given a reasonably precise content and that the "mentally ill"
can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no consti-
tutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are
dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom. 52
Thus, the Court neither confirmed nor denied that treatment is a pos-
sible justification for involuntary institutionalization. 53
46. Birnbaum, Comments, supra note 1, at 101 (emphasis added).
47. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. Id. at 1313.
49. Id.
50. 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 575.
53. Justice Stewart's opinion seems ambivalent on the issue of whether detention
is justifiable where therapeutic treatment is provided. Only two cryptic words in the
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By declining to decide whether a constitutional right to treatment
exists, the Court also left unanswered the question of whether the dan-
gerously mentally ill, unaffected by the possibility of liberty which Don-
aldson extends to the nondangerous, might have such a right. In an-
swering this question the Court would be faced with difficulties no mat-
ter which position it took. If the dangerously mentally ill have no con-
stitutional right to receive treatment and if they may be confined as
long as they remain dangerous then there would appear to be no prac-
tical or legal remedy for the deprivation of their liberty. Absent an
enforceable right to treatment, the numerous situations in which under-
staffing in mental hospitals results in little or no treatment, as was the
case with Donaldson, would more closely approximate detention under
a punishment rationale than under the therapeutic rationale now asserted.
When detention is justified for reasons of punishment, the detention
is generally accompanied, as due process requires that it must be, by
limitations now absent in the case of the mentally ill, such as the re-
quirement that confinement result from the commission of specific pro-
scribed overt acts,54 and that it be for prescribed period of time. 5
If the Court ruled in favor of a constitutional right to treatment
the difficulties would be less theoretical than practical. Arguably, the
number of institutionalized mentally ill has so outstripped the number
of competent professional personnel in state hospitals that a genuine
right to treatment would be impossible to implement. Bearing this in
mind, the Court might reject as an unacceptable administrative burden
the task of drawing up adequate minimum standards and supervising
their implementation as the district court did in Wyatt v. Stickney.5 0
Additionally, the Court might well balk at the prospect of supporting
a concept so nebulous as "adequate treatment.1
5 7
holding hint that Justice Stewart might allow treatment as a justification for continued
involuntary confinement of the mentally ill: "[A] State cannot constitutionally confine
without more a nondangerous individual. . . ." 422 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added). In
his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice left no doubt of his opposition to treatment
as a justification for involuntary confinement. "Nor can I accept the theory that a State
may lawfully confine an individual thought to need treatment and justify that deprivation
of liberty solely by providing some treatment. Our concepts of due process would not
tolerate such a 'tradeoff'." Id. at 589. On providing treatment as a justification for
involuntary confinement of the mentally ill, see Livermore, Malmquist & Meebl, On
the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 93 n.53 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Livermore].
54. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 171-211 (2d ed. 1960).
55. Id. at 55-58.
56. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
57. See note 22 supra. "Given the present state of medical knowledge regarding
abnormal human behavior and its treatment, few things would be more fraught with peril
than to irrevocably condition a State's power to protect the mentally ill upon the provid-
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B. The Rationale: New Equal Protection?
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Donaldson was based
upon an individual deprivation of liberty, the result is consistent with
one that might have been reached under modem equal protection anal-
ysis"" and invites conjecture that the Court implicitly applied a more
rigorous standard of review. A statute that interferes with the exer-
cise of a fundamental right or infringes upon the rights of a suspect
class under new equal protection analysis generally triggers the strict
scrutiny test.8 9 In marked contrast to the great deference paid to leg-
islative choices under the minimum rationality standard of review, strict
scrutiny demands that the classification be necessary to the accomplish-
ment of a compelling state interest that is protectable by no less oner-
ous alternative. If the Court in Donaldson had explicitly applied new
equal protection analysis it might have required proof of a compelling
state interest because either a fundamental right or the rights of a sus-
pect class were involved.
Applying fundamental rights analysis, the Court might have rea-
soned that since liberty is a fundamental right, deprivation of liberty
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Where the
mentally ill patient is dangerous, the state has a compelling interest in
preventing possible harm to society generally or to the mentally fll in-
dividual himself and may do so by exercising its police power. Fur-
ther, if the mentally ill individual is not dangerous to himself or others
but is incapable of functioning successfully beyond the confines of the
hospital even with the help of family or friends the state in exercise
of its parens patriae responsibility has a compelling interest in preventing
abandonment that might occur if such an individual were left to fend
for himself. If, however, the mentally ill individual is nondangerous
and is capable of functioning outside of the institution, the state has
no compelling interest in keeping him confined.
ing of 'such treatment as will give [them] a realistic opportunity to be cured.'"
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 588-89 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
58. For a general discussion of this analysis, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HAv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
59. In San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice
Powell, writing for the majority, provided one of the Court's most explicit statements
of the new equal protection theory. Fundamental rights, he wrote, are those "explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution" (id. at 33-34), and "traditional indicia of
suspectness" are found where "the class is ... saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
jected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." Id. at 28.
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Although the Court has been reluctant to add to the classifications
already recognized as suspect, 60 an argument can be made that the
mentally ill constitute a discrete class that is characterized by certain
traditional indicia of suspectness and that therefore the compelling state
interest test should be applied to any statute that infringes the rights
of the class. 61 The criteria set forth by Justice Powell in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez62 to define a suspect class63
seem to apply to the mentally ill. First, the class is saddled with obvi-
ous disabilities. Involuntary commitment statutes are generally en-
acted on the premise that the mentally ill are too irrational to be aware
that they require treatment. Second, historically, the mentally ill unde-
niably have been subject to purposeful unequal treatment.6" Third,
the mentally ill are without any meaningful political power. To a much
greater degree than members of other acknowledged or proposed sus-
pect classes the mentally ill depend for the defense of their rights on
the intercession of the majority.65 If the mentally ill are a suspect class,
60. Classifications that have been deemed suspect are race (Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)), nationality (Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)),
and alienage (In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)). Despite repeated urgings and op-
portunities to do so, a majority of the Court has refused to find sex a suspect classifica-
tion. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court has similarly declined
to designate illegitimacy (Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974)) and poverty
(James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)) as supect classes. For a thorough discus-
sion of suspect classes and equal protection generally, see Forum: Equal Protection and
the Burger Court, 2 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975).
61. An excellent, detailed analysis which suggests that the mentally ill do in fact
comprise a suspect class is found in Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?,
83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974). The author considers the effect that designation of the men-
tally ill as a suspect class would have on existing laws regarding the mentally ill.
Id. at 1258-70.
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. See note 59 supra.
64. See, e.g., A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949); N.
DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865 (1964). Dr. Birnbaum
analogizes the historical and contemporary attitude in this country towards the mentally
ill to racism-calling unequal treatment of the mentally ill "sanism." Quoting Justice
Thurgood Marshall on racism, Birnbaum suggests that "it is of no consequence to the
oppressed mentally ill whether the sanism of our society is deliberate or unintentional."
Bimbaum, Comments, supra note 1, at 105-14. "As primary evidence of the sanism that
pervades our entire society, the severely mentally ill need only point to the too often
grossly inadequate conditions that frequently exist in our state mental hospitals. These
inadequate conditions, which are due primarily to insufficient funding by our state legis-
latures, are well known and routinely accepted." Id. at 107.
65. "The mentally disabled do not have minority pride, like blacks. They do not
organize like grape pickers, or agitate like students, or rebel like prisoners. They pas-
sively wait for action to be taken on their behalf." Robitscher, Implementing the Rights
of the Mentally Disabled: Judicial, Legislative and Psychiatric Action, MEDICAL, MORAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 142 (F. Ayd ed. 1974).
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infringement of their rights can be justified only by some compelling
state interest. According to the Donaldson Court, in the absence of
dangerousness or the inability to exist successfully outside the mental
hospital the state has no compelling interest in the confinement of the
mentally ill.
Again it is conceded that nowhere in its opinion does the Donald-
son Court acknowledge use of the new equal protection analysis or ap-
plication of the strict scrutiny test. Justice Stewart characterized the
central issue of the case as the "relatively simple, but nonetheless im-
portant question concerning every man's constitutional right to lib-
erty."6  Yet as a result of the decision numerous state civil commit-
ment statutes that allowed a group, characterized by all the indicia of
a suspect class, to be deprived of a fundamental right are no longer
applicable to a large percentage of that class. This interpretation of
the result in Donaldson is only inferential since the issue of equal pro-
tection was not submitted to the Court in the briefs or urged in the
oral argument. As a tool in future cases involving the rights of the
mentally ill, however, Donaldson has fascinating equal protection po-
tential.
87
Notwithstanding the many issues left open by the Donaldson deci-
sion viewed in the historical context of treatment of the mentally ill,
the recognition that the nondangerous mentally ill have a fundamental
right to liberty is highly significant. In spite of its uncertain application
to the dangerously mentally ill, the decision seems to validate the nega-
tive implications of the right to treatment alluded to previously.
68
In the absence of a legitimate justification for confinement (be it dan-
gerousness or treatment), the mentally ill, like the sane, have a right
to liberty.
Justice Stewart's narrow holding in Donaldson raises, however, an
often neglected problem inherent in most civil commitment statutes. 69
The concept of dangerousness is a major criterion for civil commitment
although it is generally left undefined, as it was in Donaldson. The
66. 422 U.S. at 573.
67. Because St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C. and the District of Co-
lumbia right to treatment statute (D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1966)) are fertile sources
of right to treatment litigation, it should be noted that the new equal protection consid-
erations discussed with respect to Donaldson would appear to apply with equal force in
the federal context. See Justice Brennan's opinion in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975), where he declares: "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 638 n.2.
68. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
69. "In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom ... " 422 U.S. at 576 (em-
phasis added).
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holding in Donaldson promises an even more prominent role for dan-
gerousness, the new dividing line between those involuntarily commit-
ted mentally ill individuals who may go free if they wish, and those
who must remain institutionalized. The remainder of this note pre-
sents a critical and analytical examination of the concept of dangerous-
ness.
M. Dangerousness as a Viable Criterion in Civil
Commitment and Continued Confinement
of the Mentally 111
A. The Undefined Standard
Dangerousness has long been a favored standard by which legisla-
tures and courts have sought to determine the propriety of institutional-
izing mentally ill individuals.70 It continues to be used, and this usage
is underscored by Donaldson, by mental hospital officials as a deter-minant for release of patients. Given the importance of the standard,
it is remarkable that the concept of dangerousness has survived so long
without substantive definition. The reason for this lack of definition
is easily understood by analogy to a somewhat dated statement concern-
ing mental illness: "There is no great occasion to be solicitous about
the definition of a disease which everybody knows."'71 So too danger-
ousness. Our everyday experiences and interactions with people and
things supply each of us with a definition of dangerousness sufficient
to meet our casual needs. But when this community standard of dan-
gerousness becomes the legal dividing line between one group that con-
tinues to enjoy liberty and another that is involuntarily separated from
society, we must question whether such a general definition is suffi-
cient.
Under our system of jurisprudence courts would be loathe to apply
such a general standard in an area such as the criminal law.72 Yet this
standard is tolerated as applied to the mentally ill, perhaps because they
are deemed irrational and therefore incapable of recognizing their pre-
dicament, or because they are the objects of beneficent designs of the
sane majority. One is reminded, however, of the admonition of Justice
Brandeis:
70. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1976). See gen-
erally THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 72-76 (Table 3.2) (S. Brakel & R. Rock
eds. 1971); Kurnasaka, Stokes & Gupta, Criteria for Involuntary Hospitalization, 26
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 399 (1972).
71. W. BUCHAN, DOMESTIC MEDICINE; OR, THE FAMILY PHYSICIAN 303 (1772)
quoted in N. DAIN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1865, at 6
(1964).
72. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: "A Knife that Cuts
Both Ways," 51 JuDICATuRE 370 (1968) [hereiniafter cited as Dershowitz].
[Vol. 3
DONALDSON AND DANGEROUSNESS
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. . . The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
73
A review of the relatively few state commitment statutes that
attempt a definition of dangerousness supports the contention that leg-
islators have generally ignored or been unsuccessful in their efforts to
adequately define the concept. 74  Typical of one group of statutes that
attempt to define dangerousness are those that define the concept
in terms of itself. For example, the South Dakota statute75 reads:
"(3) 'Danger to himself,' behavior which constitutes a danger of inten-
tionally inflicting substantial bodily harm upon oneself; (4) 'Danger to
others,' behavior which constitutes a danger of inflicting substantial
bodily harm upon another person. '78  Although such a statute admir-
ably attempts to define the nature of the harm feared, in this instance
substantial bodily harm, it fails to shed light on the term "danger" it-
self. Such a circular definition is of doubtful utility to the courts.
A second and potentially more confusing category of statutes is
that group which defines dangerousness in terms of mental illness, thus
equating the two concepts. The Kansas statutory definition 77 of a
"mentally ill person," for example, includes one "who is or will prob-
ably become dangerous to himself, or the person or property of others
if not given 'care and treatment.' ",78 As legislative translations of com-
munity values and standards regarding mental illness, such statutes un-
doubtedly reflect in some measure the generally unfounded yet widely
accepted stereotype concerning the supposed dangerous propensities of
the mentally ill. 79  While mental illness is as illusive of precise defini-
tion as dangerousness, to define one in terms of the other is to blur
two very distinct and independent concepts. Indeed, were dangerous-
ness and mental illness equivalent, involuntary institutionalization of
the mentally ill would hinge not on any independent showing of dan-
73. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. "The variety of definitions used. . . is so great that no generalization can be
made. The statutes are replete with vague, ambiguous and circuitous terms." Judge J.
Schneider, The Court's Role in the Hospitalization and Discharge of the Mentally Ill,
reprinted in Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the ludiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess., at 678 (1969-1970) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
75. S.D. CoMP. Liws ANN. § 27-1-1.1 (Supp. 1975).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. KAN. STAT. ANNr. § 59-2902(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
78. Id.
79. While there is an inclination to equate mental illness and dangerousness, "the
fact is that the great majority of hospitalized mental patients are too passive, too silent,
too fearful, too withdrawn" to be dangerous. 1961 Hearings, supra note 15, at 43 (state-
ment of Albert Deutsch). See also Livermore, supra note 53, at 82 n.22.
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gerousness, as Donaldson implies it must, but rather on the status of
mental illness. If this were the case, the criterion of dangerousness
would be meaningless because confinement would necessarily follow the
status of mental illness. Such confinement based upon status would
raise grave due process questions regarding punishment of status of-
fenses.8 0'
B. Toward a Definition
A meaningful appraisal of dangerousness begins with the under-
standing that the concept is not self-apparent, unchanging, or capable
of absolute abstract exposition. Definitions of dangerousness borrowed
from other areas of the law are of little value in the search for its mean-
ing in the context of mental illness, where it is essentially a socially de-
fined concept. Like mental illness, dangerousness represents deviation
from the standard of conduct labeled "normal" by society. s In reality
labels such as "dangerous" and "nondangerous" as applied to human
behavior are merely a manner of distinguishing those harms resulting
from deviant behavior that society will accept without sanction from
those that cross some threshold of tolerance and require a societal
response. Focusing on the harms involved in the various types of
deviant behavior displayed by the mentally ill may produce a more realis-
tic and workable definition of dangerousness than that currently used
in the majority of the jurisdictions. Indeed, many commentators
have noted the contrast between the great detail contained in penal
codes, which enumerate specific harms for which criminal sanctions are
imposed, and the general lack of any such specificity in civil commit-
ment statutes.8 1 Whether some analogous form of behavioral code
covering the actions of the mentally ill is the best solution to the current
lack of definition of dangerousness is subject to dispute. Unlike crim-
inal codes, which detail proscribed conduct, a behavioral code for the
mentally ill would not serve the purpose of warning them in advance
80. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
81. "[S]ocial groups create deviance [dangerousness] by making the rules whose in-
fraction constitutes deviance [dangerousness], and by applying those rules to particular
people and labeling them as outsiders [dangerous]. From this point of view, deviance
[dangerousness] is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence
of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 'offender.' The deviant [dan-
gerous individual] is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant [dan-
gerous] behavior is behavior that people so label." H. BECKER, OUTSmERS: STUDIES IN
Ta SOCIOLOGY OF DE VIANCE 9 (1963). See also Shah, Crime and Mental Illness: Some
Problems in Defining and Labeling Deviant Behavior, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 21, 31 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Shah]; Kittrie, The Flowering and Decline of the Therapeutic
State?, MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 81 (F. Ayd ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Kittrie].
82. See, e.g., Dershowitz, supra note 72, at 374.
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of the consequences of their conduct since by definition the danger-
ously mentally ill would be unable to choose rationally between the pro-
scribed act and some more acceptable form of behavior. It would,
however, allow judges and juries to make commitment decisions on a
more objective basis, circumventing many of the subjective pitfalls dis-
cussed below.
In the process of drawing up such an enumeration of dangerous
acts, however, society would have to confront the core problem of pre-
cisely where the line between nuisance behavior and truly harmful con-
duct must be drawn. The Donaldson decision leaves no doubt that civil
commitment sanctions may not attach to mere nuisance behavior.
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its
citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One
might as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incar-
cerate all who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric.
Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify
the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.
83
While this statement is a guide, it does not attempt to tell us where
eccentricity and nuisance behavior end and truly harmful behavior be-
gins. Many civil commitment statutes which discuss the harmful con-
duct of the mentally ill do so only to the extent of distinguishing be-
tween the possible objects of such harm, with occasional emphasis on
degree. Thus statutes may differentiate the harm which a mentally ill
individual may cause to himself from the harm which he may cause
to others. Additionally, adjectives such as "serious" or "substantial"
may establish the degree of such harm while "bodily" or "to the prop-
erty of" may further specify the objects of the harm.84 Confinement
to prevent harm to oneself requires a different theoretical justification
from confinement to prevent harm to others. Yet the justifications
are often not distinguished by the courts.
State intervention to prevent possible harm to others is justified
under a police power rationale as in the criminal model. Intervention
to prevent harm to oneself, in contrast, is justified under the parens
patriae theory.8 Arguably, the Court's holding in Donaldson has seri-
ously limited the state's exercise of this paternalistic power.
[T]he mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person
from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. More-
over, while the State may arguably confine a person to save him
from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for
83. 422 U.S. at 575.
84. Recall the South Dakota statute; see text accompanying note 75 supra.
85. Parens patriae is derived from the English concept of the king's role as the
father of the country. "In this role, society allegedly seeks not to punish but to change
or to socialize the nonconformist through treatment and therapy." Kittrie, supra note
81, at 89.
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raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely
in freedom .... 86
Thus, the Court suggests that the possibility of harming oneself may
still provide a basis for civil commitment under the parens patriae power.
But this is no more than a throwback to questions concerning the de-
gree and nature of the harm.1
7
Few courts, juries, or experts would have difficulty finding dan-
gerousness in acts involving violent, physical injury to oneself or an-
other. More problematic is the vast gray area of bizarre, nuisance type
behavior. Should dangerousness defined by harms include physical
harms only? If so, which ones? Is some nuisance behavior sufficiently
deviant as to merit sanction or be proscribed due to emotional harm
it might cause? 88  If freedom from emotional harm is an interest
that deserves protection, where is the line to be drawn? While pub-
lic acts of exhibitionism wound the sensibilities of many, does the emo-
tional harm that may result from this deviant behavior outweigh the
individual's right to liberty?89 An underinclusive definition of danger-
ousness framed in terms of physical harms only may subject society to
intolerable levels of emotional distress. Defined overinclusively, dan-
86. 422 U.S. at 575.
87. One classic illustration of the double standard which is applied to self-destruc-
tive conduct exhibited by sane and insane people is found in a memorial to Justice Jack-
son. After suffering a severe heart attack in the spring of 1954, he was told by his
doctors that he could retire from the Court and live a life of inactivity or continue his
work on the Court with the prospect of dying at any time. "With characteristic forti-
tude he chose the second alternative." Justice Jackson died of a heart attack in October
of the same year. In Memory of Mr. Justice Jackson, 349 U.S. xxvii, xxviii-xxix (1955).
88. Freedom from emotional distress is receiving increasing protection in the
courts through civil tort actions based on the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Since these tort actions do not extend to conduct of the mentally ill, which arguably
lacks rational intention, preventing emotional harm caused by the mentally ill becomes
largely a matter of controlling nuisance behavior.
89. "Case 3: A man who compulsively engages in acts of indecent exposure has
been diagnosed as having a sociopathic personality disturbance. The probability is
eighty percent that he will again expose himself. Even if this condition is untreatable,
we would be disinclined to commit. In our view, this conduct is not sufficiently serious
to warrant extended confinement. For that reason, we would allow confinement only
if 'cure' were relatively quick and certain." Livermore, supra note 53, at 90. But see
Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1968): "Concerning the likely effect
of the appellant's exhibitionism on others, psychiatrists agreed that the effect would vary
with the viewer. . . . There was no evidence presented of any actual harm to adult
women from the appellant's past exhibitionism. Dr. Weickhardt did testify, however,
that one viewer had suffered 'serious psychological harm'-the appellant's son .. who
was six years old at the time of appellant's commitment. .. ."
"Case 4: A person afflicted witb schizophrenia walks about town making wild ges-
tures and talking incessantly. Those who view him are uncomfortable but not endan-
gered. We doubt that commitment is appropriate even though it would promote the
psychic ease of many people." Livermore, supra note 53, at 90.
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gerousness becomes synonymous with mental illness and offers little
guidance to courts and mental hospital administrators.
Dangerousness must be defined by state legislatures, and the diffi-
cult questions posed above must be answered. If, as Donaldson sug-
gests, the concept of dangerousness is to divide those mentally ill who
will remain institutionalized from those who may go or remain free,
then, to avoid constitutional invalidity for vagueness, more workable
and precise statutory definitions must be formulated. 0
C. The Likelihood of Harm
The determination that the concept of dangerousness is best ap-
proached in terms of harm does not complete the groundwork for a
workable definition. Since harmful conduct, however it is defined, will
not occur unless the mentally ill individual exhibits the proscribed be-
havior, the next inquiry must be how likely it is that a specific individual
will engage in specific harmful conduct. The inquiry regarding the
likelihood of harmful behavior subsumes three component questions.
First, how can or should a propensity to engage in harmful behavior
be shown? Second, who should determine that a likelihood of harmful
behavior exists? Third, where commitment hinges on predictability of
future harmful behavior, what degree of predictability should be de-
manded by the courts or delineated in the statutes? Similar questions
are implicitly answered in all civil commitment and habeas corpus ac-
tions involving the mentally ill, although this process is seldom articu-
lated.
While civil commitment statutes are generally not helpful, the
courts have adopted several means for assessing the likelihood that an
individual will engage in harmful behavior. As the word "likelihood"
itself indicates, the primary concern is the prediction of future harmful
behavior. Dispute in this area hinges on the appropriate basis for pre-
diction. Historically, bare prediction based on expert psychiatric testi-
mony or lay testimony in or out of court has often been a sufficient
basis.9 1 While the commission of some overt harmful act by the men-
90. The vagueness challenge rests ultimately on the procedural due process require-
ment of notice. As suggested above, due to mentally ill persons' supposed lack of ra-
tional ability to choose between proscribed and permissible conduct, the lack of notice
rationale cannot be applied. However, as one commentator has argued, the doctrine
is "most frequently employed as an implement for curbing legislative invasion of consti-
tutional rights other than that of fair notice . . . ." Note, The Void-for-Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 87-88 (1960).
91. "Mr. Justice Rehnquist: 'If [Donaldson] was not dangerous to himself or to
others, and he was competent, but there was no cure for his illness, what's the reason
for confinement?' Gearey [Asst. Atty. Gen. for Florida]: "'Well, when he was com-
mitted, there was evidence that he was dangerous both to himself and others.'" 43
U.S.L.W. 3398 (Jan. 21, 1975).
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tally ill individual might influence the determination, such behavior has
not been considered indispensable to the prediction of future harmful
conduct with resultant institutionalization. In this respect civil commit-
ment of the mentally ill is in striking contrast with the criminal model.
Criminal law traditionally has required an overt act on the part of
the offender before state intervention was justified. Thoughts
alone and propensity to action, regardless of how vile, were not
punishable. The introduction of the therapeutic model, viewing
the deviant as a man suffering from a dangerous malady, allowed
state intervention as soon as the dangerous status or condition was
diagnosed. No longer did the state have to await and react to a
harmful act. A prediction of future dangerousness was sufficient
to call into effect preventive measures. The therapeutic approach
thus permitted prophylactic interventions not possible under the
penal process.
92
The most common explanation given for this difference in prerequisites
for confinement is that unlike criminals, the mentally ill are considered
to be incapable of making the rational choice of whether to indulge
in or abstain from such harmful behavior."
Sensing the inconsistency of such a disparity of treatment between
criminal incarceration based on the commission of a specific proscribed
act and civil commitment predicated on the illusive "mental illness"
label, legal scholars, the courts, and an occasional statute have de-
"[After Donaldson's arrest] . . . the county judge ordered the sheriff of Pinellas
County to summon an 'examining committee.' Two of the committee members . . .
were physicians, but not psychiatrists. The third . . . was the Pinellas County deputy
sheriff. Later that day, each of the three committee members signed a printed form
stating that the committee had made 'a thorough examination' of Donaldson's 'mental
and physical condition.' Most of the form was left blank. The committee added only
Donaldson's age and, at the bottom of the printed form, that he suffered from 'paranoid
schizophrenia,' that his particular hallucinations were 'auditory' and 'visual,' and that his
propensities were 'delusions.'
"These five words, inserted in a form, would serve as the basis for Donaldson's
commitment. More troubling than the sketchiness of the report was Donaldson's claim
that he was not actually seen by the committee members until several days after they
had signed the form." PRUsoNERs, supra note 1, at 84-85.
92. Kittrie, supra note 81, at 91. See also 1969 Hearings, supra note 74, at 262,
263 (statement of Bruce Ennis), 303 (statement of Stephen B. Rosenberg); Morris, Le-
gal Problems Involved in Implementing the Right to Treatment, 1 BuLL. AM. AcAD.
PSYCmATRY AND LAw 1 (1972); Livermore, supra note 53, at 84.
93. Ennis, in his statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Mentally Ill, made the point that various segments of society present a
much greater propensity toward dangerousness than the mentally ill. Ex-felons, ghetto
residents, and teenage males have a much higher degree of predictability in terms of like-
lihood of future harmful behavior than the mentally ill. Yet our system of justice would
not tolerate preventive detention of any such segment of the population. "We demon-
strate our belief in individual responsibility by refusing to incarcerate save for failure
to make a responsible decision." Livermore, supra note 49, at 86. However, as Ennis
points out, "If a sane man is dangerous, then, by definition, his 'rationality' and aware-
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manded that institutionalization of the mentally ill justified by alleged
harmful propensities be based on the more palpable foundation of the
recent commission of some overt act. Typical is the recent holding in
Lynch v. Baxley:
94
To confine a citizen against his will because he is likely to be dan-
gerous in the future, it must be shown that he has actually been
dangerous in the recent past and that such danger was manifested
by an overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to him-
self or to another.9 5
Similarly, a recent addition to the Arizona statutes on mental health
defines "danger to others" as follows:
"Danger to others" means behavior which constitutes a danger of
inflicting substantial bodily harm upon another person based upon
a history of having inflicted or having attempted to inflict substan-
tial bodily harm upon another person within twelve months pre-
ceding the hearing on court ordered treatment. 96
Thus the Arizona statute specifies the type of harm proscribed (bodily
or physical harm), the degree of harm (substantial), and the time pe-
riod within which the harm must have occurred (twelve months).
9 7
ness of the consequences of apprehension do not deter his dangerous acts." 1969 Hear-
ings, supra note 68, at 263.
94. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
95. Id. at 391. See also 1969 Hearings, supra note 74, at 83, 265.
96. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501.3 (Supp. 1974-1975). The statute goes on to
provide for an extension of the twelve month period if the patient has been physi-
cally or pharmacologically restrained, or confined during this preceding period, or the
attempted harm was "grievous or horrendous." (Note the common "danger means be-
havior which constitutes a danger" language discussed at text accompanying note 75
supra.) Section 36-501.4 defines danger to self as "behavior which constitutes a danger
of inflicting substantial bodily harm upon oneself, including attempted suicide." The
section further excludes inability to provide for personal food, clothing, or shelter needs
or the effects of degenerative brain disease and old age from the category of "danger
to self." This enumeration of included and excluded harms, though by no means ex-
haustive, is valuable in providing much needed guidance to the courts that must apply
otherwise vague and usually undistinguished concepts of dangerousness to self and
others.
See also California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act provisions with respect to civil
commitment of the dangerously mentally ill. CAL WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE §§ 5260,
5264, 5300 (West 1972). The law authorizes involuntary confinement of a person who
is suicidal, but for no more than thirty-one days. At the end of that time he must be re-
leased unless he is dangerous to others or is so "gravely disabled" that a conservator can
be appointed. A person who presents an "imminent threat of substantial physical harm to
others" can be confined for ninety days, but only if he threatened, attempted, or inflicted
physical harm upon another in the immediate past. Thereafter, he can be held for an
additional ninety days, but only if he still "presents an imminent threat of substantial
physical harm to others," and only if he "threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical
harm" to another during his initial period of confinement.
97. The authors of what is undoubtedly the most thorough examination of predic-
tion of dangerousness reached the following conclusion regarding the relationship be.
tween prediction of dangerousness and the presence or absence of some overt act: "We
Spring 19761
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Such attempts by courts and legislatures to isolate and to define ob-
jectively the basis for a finding of dangerousness are to be applauded.
Whether the prediction of harmful behavior is based on an overt
act or some other measure of predictability, a primary concern is who
should make the determination. Traditionally, judges and juries have
shown great deference to the medical expert, generally the psychiatrist,
in civil commitment and habeas corpus proceedings. On questions of
dangerousness and prediction of harmful behavior laymen evince a
reverence for physicians generally by tending to defer to the psychiatric
profession, although psychiatrists themselves disagree as to symptoms
and treatment of mental illness.9 As a result, judges and juries often
act as surrogates for medical experts when making determinations in
commitment proceedings.
Several criticisms may be leveled against such reliance. First, just
as dangerousness has remained largely undefined by the law, so also
has it eluded medical definition. Indeed, "[pireoccupation with labels
or definitions is operationally irrelevant to the dynamically-oriented
psychiatrist."9 9  We should not be surprised, then, to find that when
asked as an expert medical witness to discuss the dangerousness of a
certain individual, the psychiatrist applies many of the same subjective
standards to the determination that a layman might.
There are different vectors of considerations that culminate
in a psychiatrist's resultant conclusion as to "dangerousness," yea
or nay. Some aspects are primarily determined by his expertise,
and others by his value preferences in matters involving commun-
ity values . . . .100
To the degree that the psychiatrist bases his decision concerning dan-
gerousness on "community values and standards" he ceases to be an
expert witness and enters an area in which the judge or jury has been
given the responsibility of deciding. One solution to such difficulties
is to require that the expert medical witness inform the court as much
as possible of the subjective, "community value" aspects of his con-
clusion.
submit that to properly assess indications of possible dangerousness in the absence of
an actual instance of dangerous acting out requires the highest degree of psychiatric ex-
pertise and may well exceed the present limits of our knowledge .... No one can pre-
dict dangerous behavior in an individual with no history of dangerous acting out."
Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CmumJ
& DELINQUENCY 371, 384 (1972) (final emphasis added).
98. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 694-95 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Coins].
See also Dershowitz, supra note 72; Shah, supra note 81, at 31.
99. 1969 Hearings, supra note 74, at 679 (statement of J. Schneider).
100. United States v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Lynch
v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Dershowitz, supra note 72.
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[Tihe jury hearing a psychiatrist's testimony of dangerousness,
should be informed of its various components .... The expert
must be prepared to state the bases for his conclusion and be
aware that the attorney, seeking to expose the predicate of the
expert's conclusion is not necessarily challenging his expertise with-
in its proper realm, but may properly be seeking to ask the jury to
come to a different ultimate conclusion on the basis of the com-
munity-value factor involved.101
It should be noted that attorneys often invite such unarticulated,
community value laden conclusions by the vagueness and generality of
their questioning of medical experts. Rather than asking whether or
not the psychiatrist believes that X is a danger to himself and others,
attorneys could more profitably ask what types of harmful behavior X
might engage in if left at liberty, and what the probability is that X
will, in fact, so behave. 102
Considering these subjective inputs to the psychiatrist's determina-
tion of dangerousness as well as continued discord within the medical
profession as to treatment and diagnosis of various mental ailments, we
again should not be surprised that, like laymen, medical experts often
err in their prediction that a given individual is or will be dangerous.
What is surprising is the assertion that psychiatrists are less accurate
in their predictions of future dangerous behavior than various nonex-
perts. After extensive research, one commentator, reporting on various
studies following up psychiatric predictions of anti-social behavior,
stated:
[Tihese few studies strongly suggest that psychiatrists are rather
inaccurate predictors; inaccurate in an absolute sense, and even
less accurate when compared with other professionals, such as
psychologists, social workers and correctional officials; and when
compared to actuarial devices, such as prediction or experience
101. United States v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Gold-
stein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations of the Decision
to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960) [herein-
after cited as Goldstein & Katz]. "]n deciding whether behavior "X" (e.g., homosexual
acts) is sufficiently 'dangerous' to preclude release, the psychiatrist, as any other member
of the community, may attempt to influence legislative and court decisions by expressing
his value preferences. Making such a distinction among the roles psychiatrists may play
at different points in the decision-making process should alert them, as well as all par-
ticipants, to the extent to which value preferences permeate expert judgments. This, in
turn, should prompt careful scrutiny of conclusionary statements qualified by such
phrases as 'on the basis of my professional opinion . . . ' expose those views which pri-
marily reflect the psychiatrist's value preferences, and thus facilitate identification of de-
cision points at which the psychiatrist should minimize his value orientation and at
which the community has the right to establish policy. This is not to suggest that ex-
perts are to avoid, or can avoid, value judgments, but rather that they openly articulate
them as such." Id. at 231 (final emphasis added).
102. For examples of the generalized questioning that too often takes place in civil
commitment and habeas corpus proceedings, see 1969 Hearings, supra note 74, at 410-12.
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tables. Even more significant for legal purposes, it seems that
psychiatrists are particularly prone to one type of error--over-
prediction. In other words, they tend to predict anti-social con-
duct in many instances where it would not, in fact, occur.10 3
One cogent explanation of this phenomenon of overprediction of dan-
gerousness is found in an article by Jerome J. Shestack. 10 4  Shestack
suggests that in evaluating the possible behavior of a mentally ill indi-
vidual the psychiatrist is subjected to what may essentially be a conflict
of interest. The author illustrates this conflict by quoting Judge
Bazelon:
At the Napa State Hospital in California a few years ago, the sup-
erintendent told me in a public meeting that the staff had "Sacra-
mento looking over its shoulder" on all internal decisions. I
learned that psychiatric opinions are influenced by the public
outcry for "Law and Order" and by personal fears for safety....
I have even been told that psychiatrists believe they are justified
in fudging their testimony on "dangerousness" if they are con-
vinced that an individual is too sick to know that he needs help. 0 5
Alternative explanations of the apparent unreliability of psychi-
atric predictions have been summarized by Ennis and Litwack as fol-
lows: (1) orientation and training-the mental health professional has
a "set" to perceive mental illness; (2) context--dress of the patient
and the mental hospital environment of the interview simply add to the
impression of the interviewer that the patient must not be "normal";
(3) timing-short interviews allow only a very restricted view of a pa-
tient; 1 6  (4) class and culture-individual socio-economic back-
grounds; (5) personal biases-individual personality, value systems
and preferences; (6) inadequacies of the diagnostic system and am-
biguity of psychiatric data; (7) lack of training and experience in pre-
dicting dangerousness.0 7  If, as it seems, the yardstick by which psy-
103. Dershowitz, supra note 72, at 377. "Perhaps the psychiatrist is an expert at
predicting which of the persons so diagnosed are dangerous. Sane people, too, are dan-
gerous, and it may legitimately be inquired whether there is anything in the education,
training or experience of psychiatrists which renders them particularly adept at predict-
ing dangerous behavior. Predictions of dangerous behavior, no matter who makes them,
are incredibly inaccurate, and there is a growing consensus that psychiatrists are not
uniquely qualified to predict dangerous behavior and are, in fact, less accurate in their
predictions than other professionals." 1969 Hearings, supra note 74, at 277-78 (state-
ment of Bruce Ennis), quoted in Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355,
364-65 n.2 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also 1969 Hearings, supra note 74,
at 83 (statement of Dr. David J. Vail).
104. Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, MEDICAL, MORAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 7 (F. Ayd ed. 1974).
105. Id. at 11 n.3.
106. Even though a patient's behavior may be consistent over time, short interviews
may accentuate the effects of otherwise normal mood changes.
107. Coins, supra note 98, at 719-34. Such brief descriptions of the explanations
for unreliability of psychiatric predictions are unfair abbreviations of the authors' in-
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chiatric experts have measured dangerousness is one that the court
and jury are equally if not better able to apply, then basic rules of evi-
dence limit expert testimony on the likelihood of dangerousness. 08
While expert medical opinion will still be essential to illuminate various
facts, symptoms, and characteristics of a given illness or patient, the
judge and jury should be free as the ultimate decision makers to eval-
uate potential dangerousness and to do so in the light of reasonably
clear statutory definitions.: 09
The third and final inquiry in the consideration of the likelihood
of harm involves the degree of predictability of harmful behavior which
should be required by the courts or set forth in statutes. Rephrased,
the issue is: what is the standard of proof necessary in prediction of
harmful behavior to require institutionalization of the individual? Es-
sentially, three possibilities exist. Civil commitment may be based on
prediction of harmful behavior beyond a reasonable doubt (criminal
model), by a preponderance of evidence (civil model), or by clear and
convincing evidence."10
depth analysis. The Ennis-Litwack article is by far the most ambitious and thorough
compilation and analysis yet attempted regarding various studies on aspects of psychi-
atric prediction. Additionally, this article contains a thorough discussion of the legal
consequences of the inexpertness of an expert psychiatric witness. The authors briefly
summarize their conclusions as follows: "(a) there is no evidence warranting the as-
sumption that psychiatrists can accurately determine who is 'dangerous'; (b) there is lit-
tle or no evidence that psychiatrists are more 'expert' in making the predictions relevant
to civil commitment than laymen; (c) 'expert' judgments made by psychiatrists are not
sufficiently reliable and valid to justify nonjudicial hospitalization based on such judg-
ments; (d) the constitutional rights of individuals are seriously prejudiced by the admis-
sibility of psychiatric terminology, diagnoses, and predictions, especially those of 'dan-
gerous' behavior; and therefore (e) courts should limit testimony by psychiatrists to de-
scriptive statements and should exclude psychiatric diagnoses, judgments, and predic-
tions." Id. at 696.
108. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 801 (West 1965). "If a witness is testifying as an ex-
pert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: (a)
related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of
an expert would assist the trier of fact." Id. (emphasis added). Given the rather poor
record of psychiatric predictions of dangerous behavior by the mentally ill, it appears
that dangerousness, if assessed in accordance with statutory guidelines, would not be be-
yond the common experience of the trier of fact. See generally WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 555-56, 1918 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRMIc,, EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. 1972).
109. See generally In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States
v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661, 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Goldstein & Katz, supra note 101,
at 230; Shah, supra note 81, at 31.
110. Most state civil commitment statutes are silent as to the standard of proof by
which an individual must be shown to require institutionalization. The few which do
approach the issue are often vague. Thus, the Wisconsin statute provides that a court
may order a patient involuntarily committed if it is "satisfied that he is mentally ill or
infirm or deficient and that he is a proper subject for custody and treatment .. " Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 51.02(5)(c) (1957) (emphasis added). The South Dakota statute, which
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Labels such as civil and criminal are not helpful in supplying the
proper standard. Although the confinement of the mentally ill is
termed civil commitment, the deprivation of liberty to which such a pro-
ceeding may lead is anomalous in the noncriminal common law. While
an occasional case has held the civil "preponderance of evidence"
standard to be sufficient in civil commitment,11' the better view requires
a higher level of proof when the liberty of an individual is at stake.
A split of authority exists as to the remaining two standards.
While some courts have applied the less rigorous "clear and convinc-
ing" standard,1 1 2 other courts, quoting broadly supportive language in
recent Supreme Court decisions, have adopted the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard.1" Although the difference between the standards
is perhaps only semantic, given the aforementioned uncertainty sur-
rounding predictions of dangerousness and given the transcendent
value of liberty, the Constitution would seem to require the higher
standard.
Conclusion
Donaldson represents the high water mark of a movement that
has been developing over the last sixteen years. The intense academic
and judicial ferment surrounding the existence of and constitutional
basis for a right to treatment has had a marked effect on the civil com-
mitment statutes of over half the states. Although extensive in its poten-
tial practical effect, Donaldson has left critical questions unanswered.
Do those dangerous mentally ill who remain institutionalized after Don-
aldson have a right to treatment? Has the Court implicitly applied new
equal protection analysis to involuntary commitment of the mentally ill,
either on the basis of the fundamental right involved or on a tacit des-
ignation of the mentally ill as a suspect class? In either case, does will-
ingness to provide therapeutic treatment constitute a compelling state
provides that the standard for commitment of the mentally ill shall be "clear and con-
vincing evidence," is exceptional. S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 27-7-13.1 (Supp. 1975).
111. E.g., In re Alexander, 372 F.2d 925, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
112. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney
General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d
315, 326, 309 N.E.2d 733, 741 (1974).
113. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Schmidt v.
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See also Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407
U.S. 355, 364-65 (1972) cert. dismissed as improvidently granted (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). "Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of plac-
ing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion
of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
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interest which could justify involuntary institutionalization? In citing
nondangerousness as a governing criterion by which the right to liberty
of the mentally ill is to be determined, the Court points to an eminently
uncertain standard. If Donaldson is to have the effect intended by the
Court, of freeing or allowing to remain at liberty those who are able
to function outside the environment of the mental hospital and who pre-
sent no risk of harm to the community, legislatures and courts must
adopt and implement realistic guidelines defining dangerousness.

